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A  Pacific  Climate  Treaty  is  proposed  to  advance  climate  action  in  the  Pacific  and globally. The treaty will 
support regional cooperation on  mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage,  climate-induced  migration  and    
access  to  justice.  Moreover,  it  could  set  up institutions-such as a Pacific Islands Climate Commission-to       
further enhance regional cooperation and promote Pacific climate leadership. The treaty would set a precedent 
that could inspire similar regulatory action elsewhere in the world, building on the momentum created by the 
new Paris Agreement. This report explains the initiative and presents a model  Pacific  Climate  Treaty  that  
draws  on  the  joint  leadership  of  Pacific  Island governments and civil society in the global movement to tackle 
climate change. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The  initiative  of  a  Pacific  Climate  Treaty  builds  on  the  momentum  of  the  Paris Agreement  adopted  under  the  United  
Nations  Framework  Convention  on  Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) 
in December 2015. Although the adoption of this new international climate change treaty marks  a  major  breakthrough          
in  international  diplomacy,  the  advances  made  with  the Agreement are mainly procedural. The single most important   
exception is the Agreement’s  long-term  temperature  goal  of ‘holding  the  increase  in  the  global  average temperature to 
well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial 
levels’. However, the Agreement lacks substantive obligations for its State parties that would ensure the achievement of this 
goal. Instead, the system rests on a structure of ‘nationally determined contributions’ or  ‘NDCs’  which  are  not  legally     
binding  and  set  by  State  parties  themselves.  
 
The weakness of this system is apparent from current  pledges which, if fully implemented, would  put  the  world  on  a  pathway  
of  at  least  2.7°C  of  global  temperature  rise. Such levels of warming would have catastrophic consequences for Pacific Island 
Development States (PSIDS). And the non-binding nature of the pledges means that it will be difficult, if  not  impossible,  to  hold  
individual  States  to  account  for  emission  patterns  that  are inconsistent  with  the  global  goal.  Climate  action  will  therefore  
continue  to  depend  on regulatory  action  at  the  national  and  regional  levels.  At  the  same  time,  however,  such action will 
become more visible as a result of the oversight frameworks established under the Paris Agreement.  
 
The Model Pacific Climate Treaty presented in this report is a draft model treaty for the Pacific region aimed at averting the mul-
tiple threats posed by climate change. The model treaty contains concrete regional targets that combine climate, development 
and human rights objectives--such as the target of ensuring universal access to sufficient amounts of clean and affordable energy 
for all Pacific islanders and for a growing productive sector by  2030.  This  target  is  coupled  with  a  provision  that  creates  the  
legal  basis  for  an ambitious  renewable  energy  framework,  which  should  enable  PSIDS  to  access  climate finance for pro-
jects with economy-wide development gains. At the same time, the Treaty provides a bold example of the region’s commitment 
to keeping global temperature rise well  below  1.5°C  by  banning  new  coal  or  fossil  fuel  mines  in  the  territories  of  State 
parties. The latter provisions draw on Pacific leadership in the growing global movement for an immediate halt to new fossil fuel 
mines to accelerate the transition from carbon-intensive  to  renewable  energy.  
 
This  leadership  was  particularly  apparent  when  Pacific Island leaders formally expressed their joint commitment to ‘an inter-
national moratorium on  the  development  and  expansion  of  fossil  fuel  extracting  industries,  particularly  the construction  of  
new  coal  mines,  as  an  urgent  step  towards  decarbonising  the  global economy’ in the Suva Declaration on Climate Change 
adopted under the auspices of the Pacific  Islands  Development  Forum  (PIDF)  in  September  2015. A  similar  call  for  a global 
moratorium on all new coal mines was made by leaders from the Cook Islands, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau 
and Tuvalu in the Smaller Island States Leaders’  Port  Moresby  Declaration  on  Climate  Change,  also  adopted  in  September 
2015.  
 
These  calls  have  been  embraced,  echoed  and  amplified  by  civil  society  in  the Pacific  and  around  the  world.  Through  its  
focus  on  sustainable  development  and renewable energy, the Treaty combines continued Pacific leadership  in the phase-out 
of fossil fuels with the promotion of economic and social development. While  illustrating  the  region’s  commitment  to  combat  
climate  change  and  achieve sustainable development, the Model Pacific Climate Treaty also reflects the urgent need to deal 
with the adverse effects of climate change that are already being experienced in the region. Moreover, it sets up structures and 
institutions to address future impacts of climate change and to ensure that the human rights of individuals and communities in 
Pacific Islands are optimally protected at all times. The Model Treaty has provisions on adaptation, loss and damage, climate-
induced displacement and access to justice which attest  to  PSIDS’  commitment  to  address  these  issues  comprehensively  and  
effectively through action at the national, regional and international levels. The Model Treaty also contains a clause aimed at 
securing the perpetual sovereignty and rights of Pacific Island peoples and their territories, in the face of the existential threats 
posed by climate change to many Pacific Island nations and communities. As for institutions, the Treaty sets up a Pacific  Islands  
Climate  Commission  to  further  enhance  regional  cooperation  and promote  Pacific  leadership  in  meeting  the  challenges  
posed  by  climate  change,  and  a Pacific Islands Climate Compensation Fund to help facilitate compensation for Pacific Island 
communities and nations affected by climate change from actors with significant historical responsibility for climate change. The  
Pacific  Climate  Treaty  could  anchor  the  most  ambitious  part  of  the  long -term temperature goal contained in the Paris 
Agreement—the 1.5°C limit--into a new source of  law.  Although  this  provision  would  not  directly  affect  the  Paris  Agree-
ment  or  its interpretation,  it  would  be  an  important  demonstration  of  PSIDS’  continued commitment to keeping global 
temperature rise below 1.5°C. In a similar vein, the Treaty could  showcase  PSIDS’  commitment  to  the  protection  of  Pacific  
cultures  and  the enjoyment  of  human  rights,  including  the  rights  of  ‘climate  migrants’  or  ‘climate refugees’,  in  the  face  
of  climate  change.  Again,  this  commitment  was  powerfully articulated in the Suva Declaration on Climate Change and other 
regional declarations, many of which are affirmed in the  Preamble of the Model Treaty. Adopting a regional Treaty  that  deals  
comprehensively  with  all  these  aspects  of  climate  change  would  fill glaring gaps in the protection of those who are most 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, while inspiring more ambitious action in other regions and at the global level. 
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WHAT IS A PACIFIC CLIMATE TREATY? 
The  Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties  (VCLT)  defines  a  treaty  as  ‘an international  instrument  concluded       
between  States  in  written  form  and  governed  by international  law,  whether  embodied  in  a  single  instrument  or  in  
two  or  more  related instruments and whatever its particular designation’. A Pacific Climate Treaty could be similar  to  other  
regional and international treaties banning or phasing out entire categories of substances or products that are known to be 
harmful to humanity, such as the Montreal Protocol, the Basel Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological 
Weapons  Convention and the Mine Ban Treaty. 
 
As there is currently no treaty that bans or phases out fossil fuels, the Treaty would set a pioneering example to the rest of the 
world. As indicated above, the Treaty could also comprise other aspects of  climate  change  that  are  of  essential  importance  to  
PSIDS,  including  sustainable development,  adaptation,  loss  and  damage,  climate-induced  migration,  human  rights, sover-
eignty, access to justice and compensation.  
A treaty is binding on a State only if that State has solemnly agreed to be bound by the treaty. For this reason, the provisions of 
multilateral treaties are nearly always the product of  intense  negotiations  between  States.  International  negotiations  under  
the  UNFCCC have  shown  that  achieving  provisions  that  ban  or  phase  out  fossil  fuels  in  an international  treaty  is  political-
ly  impossible  in  the  short  run.   
The  proposed  Climate Treaty  is  therefore  a  regional  treaty  under  the  auspices  of  PIDF,  with  its  potential membership  
limited  to  PSIDS.   
The  rationale  is  that  potential  Parties  to  the  Treaty already possess the political courage and commitment needed to adopt a 
flagship legal instrument  that  is  sufficiently  ambitious  to  prevent  catastrophic  changes  in  the  global climate  system.   
Negotiating  a  Pacific  Climate  Treaty  also  allows  Parties  to  tailor  the Treaty’s  provisions  to  the  specific  needs  of  PSIDS  
while  promoting  Pacific  cultures, traditions and values. Such a treaty, when implemented in collaboration with PIDF and civil  
society,  would  send  a  powerful  signal  to  markets,  governments  and  civil  society around the world that the end of fossil fuels 
is near, with Pacific Islanders acting not as victims of climate change but as agents of change.  
An important precedent for the Pacific Climate Treaty is the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Rarotonga Treaty). This 
treaty was negotiated between members of the Pacific Islands Forum against a backdrop of nuclear tensions between great      
political powers.  
The Rarotonga Treaty is an arms control agreement which bans the manufacture or  possession of nuclear weapons amongst    
Parties to the treaty, establishing a ‘nuclear free zone’ with boundaries stretching from Latin America to the Antarctic zone in the 
south to the equator.  
Although the Rarotonga Treaty, despite its title, did not establish a zone in which all nuclear activities were prohibited, it did act as 
a ‘braking mechanism’ in the  nuclear  arms  race  by  ensuring  that  the  South  Pacific  region  would  remain  nuclear weapons-
free. 
The Pacific Climate Treaty would work in a  similar  way: it  would  not immediately make the use and production of fossil fuels 
illegal, but it would impose the first-ever moratorium on new coal and fossil fuel mines in a legally binding instrument covering a 
huge portion of the Earth’s surface.  
This would demonstrate to the rest of the world that phasing out fossil fuels with a view to keeping global temperature rise below 
1.5°C is possible 
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A PACIFIC VISION FOR CLIMATE ACTION 
The  vision  that  underpins  the  initiative  for  a  Pacific  Climate  Treaty  is  set  out  in  the Preamble of the Model Pacific     
Climate Treaty. The Preamble starts by highlighting the devastating effects of climate change that are already being               
experienced in the Pacific and the  existential  threats  posed  by  future  climate  change,  while  spelling  out  the consequenc-
es thereof for internationally protected human rights: 
 Gravely distressed about the impacts of climate change that are already causing loss and damage to our people, societies, 
livelihoods and natural environments, depriving many of our people of their fundamental human rights; 
 Concerned that climate change creates existential threats to our very survival and that this, coupled with other climate 
impacts, puts the right of self-determination and all other human rights of our people at risk; 
 
 
The Preamble proceeds to highlight that despite the near-universally ratified UNFCCC climate change has not been adequately 
addressed so far, and both action to limit global warming and funding for mitigation and adaptation remain grossly inadequate: 
 Concerned that emission patterns over the past two decades have been in sharp contrast  to the ultimate objective of       
preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, as stipulated in the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change; 
 Concerned  that  current  international  action  to  limit  global  temperature  rise  remains  grossly inadequate, and that fossil 
fuel production, including the construction of new coal mines, continues to increase; 
 Concerned  that  current  levels  of  grant-based  funding  for  mitigation  and  adaptation  remain insufficient to realise the 
right to sustainable development and to design and implement adaptation measures  that  address  all  vulnerable  sectors  
including  health,  education,  water  and  sanitation, energy, fisheries and oceans, agriculture and forestry; 
The remainder of the Preamble clarifies that the Pacific vision for climate action is based on the principles of prevention, climate 
justice, non-discrimination and inclusiveness,  drawing on the Suva Declaration on Climate Change and other regional statements.  
It concludes: 
 Reiterating our commitment to sustainable development and the phasing-out of fossil fuels at the  
 national, regional and global level; 
 Determined to take, facilitate and promote urgent action to address the causes of climate change and deal with its adverse 
effects. 
The operational part of the Model Pacific Climate Treaty provides text suggestions for provisions  that  would  promote  sustaina-
ble  development,  phase  out  fossil  fuels  and address  the  aspects  of  climate  change  that  pose  the  greatest  challenges  to  
the  Pacific people.  
The text suggestions are based on regional statements and declarations adopted by  Pacific  Island  leaders  and  other  regional  
stakeholders  in  recent  years,  as  well  as PSIDS’  positions  in  international  climate  negotiations  and    other  international  
forums.  
The Model Pacific Climate Treaty also builds on the strongest parts of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto  Protocol and  the  Paris            
Agreement.  It  draws  further  inspiration  from  the Rarotonga  Treaty  and  other  regional  environmental  treaties,  internation-
al  and  regional human rights treaties and the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (‘Aarhus Convention’). 
Both  the  preamble  and  operational  provisions  of  the  Model  Treaty merit further and more detailed explanation.  
This is provided in the Commentaries to the Model Treaty in the second part of this report. 
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MODEL PACIFIC CLIMATE TREATY WITH COMMENTARY 
PREAMBLE 
The Parties to this Treaty,  
 
United in their commitment to a safe and stable climate; 
 
 
 Gravely distressed about the impacts of climate change that are already causing loss and damage to our people, societies, 
livelihoods and natural environments, depriving many of our people of their fundamental human rights; 
 Concerned that climate change creates existential threats to our very survival and that this, coupled with other climate       
impacts, puts the right of self-determination and all other human rights of our people at risk; 
 Reaffirming the importance of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its associated instruments 
in preventing, and dealing with, the adverse effects of climate change in a manner that is fair and equitable; 
 Reaffirming the Smaller Island States Leaders‟  Port Moresby Declaration on Climate Change, the  Suva  Declaration  on       
Climate  Change,  the  Nuku ’alofa  Ministerial  Declaration  on Sustainable Weather and Climate Services for a Resilient      
Pacific, the Polynesian Leaders’ Taputapuatea Declaration on Climate Change, the Boknake Haus Communiqué of the 15th 
Micronesian  Presidents’  Summit,  the  Lifou  Ministerial  Declaration  on  Climate  Change,  the SIDS  Accelerated  Modalities  
of Action  (SAMOA)  Pathway,  the  Majuro  Declaration  for Climate  Leadership,  the  Melanesian  Spearhead  Group          
Declaration  on  Environment  and Climate Change, and the Niue Declaration on Climate Change;  
 Concerned that emission patterns over the past two decades have been in sharp contrast  to the ultimate objective of          
preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, as stipulated in the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change; 
 Concerned  that  current  international  action  to  limit  global  temperature  rise  remains  grossly inadequate, and that fossil 
fuel production, including the construction of new coal mines, continues to increase; 
 Concerned  that  current  levels  of  grant-based  funding  for  mitigation  and  adaptation  remain insufficient to realise the 
right to sustainable development and to design and implement adaptation measures  that  address  all  vulnerable  sectors  
including  health,  education,  water  and  sanitation, energy, fisheries and oceans, agriculture and forestry; 
 Reiterating our commitment to sustainable development and the phasing-out of fossil fuels at the national, regional and    
global level; 
 Determined to take, facilitate and promote urgent action to address the causes of climate change and deal with its adverse 
effects; 
 Considering that adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change and averting, minimising and addressing loss and       
damage associated with climate change are a matter of survival; 
 Recognising that addressing gender-based inequality and discrimination is essential for effective action on climate change; 
 Recognising the importance of engaging, as equal partners, civil society, women, youth and persons with disabilities, in all 
efforts towards building climate change resilience; 
 
Agree as follows: 
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COMMENTARY 
(1)  The Preamble starts with a paragraph that articulates PSIDS’ joint commitment to a safe and stable climate, 
followed by two paragraphs that highlight the human rights consequences of climate change. The language of     
these paragraphs is based on the Suva Declaration on Climate Change and numerous resolutions of the United   
Nations Human  Rights  Council  which  recognise  that  climate  change  poses  a  threat  to  the enjoyment  of     
human  rights. These  preambular  paragraphs  specifically  characterise climate  change  as  a  threat  to  the  right  
of  self-determination  and  all  other  rights,  thus implying  that  all  States—including  States  outside  the          
region—must  combat  climate change and assist PSIDS in dealing with adverse effects as a matter of legal           
obligation under international human rights law.  
(2)  The fourth preambular paragraph clarifies that the Treaty complements rather than replaces the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol 
and the Paris Agreement. This is important not only to safeguard the environmental integrity of these instruments, but also to 
ensure that climate action upholds the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. For 
PSIDS, the UNFCCC and its associated instruments are also essential to ensure continued and increased access to finance, capaci-
ty building and technologies—which developed countries are obliged to provide under these treaties. The  fifth  preambular   
paragraph  highlights  the  most  relevant  regional  statements  on climate change, including those that are cited  in the Suva   
Declaration. These statements provide an important part of the historical context of the Treaty.  
(3)  The sixth preambular  paragraph expresses concern about emission patterns over the past two decades having been ‘in sharp 
contrast to the ultimate objective of preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, as stipulated in 
the United Nations  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change’.  This  paragraph  suggests  that Parties to the UNFCCC,        
especially developed country Parties, should have made drastic emission cuts long ago in accordance with the principle of com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities  and  respective  capabilities  and  the  ultimate  objective  of  this  treaty  to prevent 
‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’. This concern reflects the Pacific position that the UNFCCC is an 
instrument that in itself imposes legal  obligations  on  its  Parties—a  position  that  can  be  defended  by  referring  to  the      
general rule of treaty interpretation that provisions of a treaty  must be interpreted in the light of the object and purpose of the 
treaty. Legally and morally, the suggestion that the  UNFCCC  creates  legal  obligations  which  might  already  have  been  violat-
ed strengthens  the  Pacific  claim  for  adaptation  support,  compensation  and  support  for ‘migration with dignity’ based on 
historical responsibility for climate change. 
(4)  The  seventh  preambular  paragraph  addresses  one  of  the  greatest  omissions  of  the Paris Agreement  –  the lack of     
references to fossil fuels  –  and explains the  rationale for the ban on new coal and fossil fuel mines and other measures to      
accelerate the transition to  renewable  energy  contained  in  Article  3(2)  of  the  Treaty.  This  paragraph  draws  on paragraph 6 
of the Suva Declaration on Climate Change. 
(5)  The eighth preambular paragraph addresses the continued lack of adequate funding for  mitigation  and  adaptation.  The  
paragraph  refers  to  the  right  to  sustainable development—protected  under  Article  3(4)  of  the  UNFCCC—and  hints  at  
nonfulfilment  of  developed  countries’  obligations  under  that  treaty  to  provide  climate finance. The paragraph further      
provides a non-exhaustive list of sectors within PSIDS that are vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. This list in-
cludes the sectors highlighted in the Suva Declaration on Climate Change and adds ‘education’ and ‘oceans’.  The  emphasis  on  
grant-based  finance  reflects  PSIDS’  call  for  adaptation measures to be 100% grant-financed. 
(6)  The  ninth  preambular  paragraph  states  that  ‘adaptation  to  the  adverse  effects  of climate change and averting,           
minimising and addressing loss and damage associated with climate  change  are  a  matter  of  survival’.  This  language  builds  
on  statements  made  by Pacific leaders at international meetings, including at COP21 in Paris. The tenth and eleventh preambu-
lar paragraphs are taken verbatim from the Suva Declaration on Climate  Change  and  reflect  overwhelming  support  from     
Pacific  leaders  and  civil society.  
(7) The final preambular paragraphs draws on paragraph 6 of the Suva Declaration and also  reflects  Sustainable  Development  
Goal  (SDG)  13:  ‘Take  urgent  action  to  combat climate change and its impacts’. The language here is broader, with Parties  
expressing determination to ‘take, facilitate and promote urgent action to address the causes of climate change and deal with its 
adverse effects’. The expressed determination to ‘take’ action reflects Pacific leadership to act at the national and regional levels, 
while the words ‘facilitate and promote’ signal the need for international cooperation, financial and technical assistance and   
urgent action to tackle climate change in other regions . 
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 Article 1.  USAGE OF TERMS 
 
For the purpose of this Treaty, the definitions contained in Article 1 of the United Nations Framework               
Convention shall apply.  
In addition: 
1.  “Territory”  means  internal  
waters,  territorial  sea  and       
archipelagic  waters,  the  seabed  
and subsoil beneath, the land   
territory and the airspace above 
them.  
2.  “Sustainable  development”  
means  development  that  meets  
the  needs  of  the  present  with-
out comprising the ability of      
future generations to meet their 
own needs.  
3.  “Human  rights”  means  the  
human  rights  protected  under  
customary  international  law,  the 
Charter of the United Nations and 
relevant human rights treaties 
ratified by the Parties.  
4.  “Loss and damage” means    
negative effects of climate-related 
stressors that occur despite efforts 
to reduce or    prevent greenhouse 
gas emissions and adapt to        
climate change.  
5.  “Climate-induced  migration”  
refers  to  movement  of  people  
within  or  across national  borders 
because of sudden or gradual   
environmental disruption that is 
consistent with  climate change.  
6.  “Compensation” means  money 
awarded to person(s) or nation(s) 
who suffer loss and damage.  
7.  “Fund  administrator”  means  
the  organisation  responsible  for  
managing  the  Pacific  Islands   
Climate Compensation Fund under 
Article 7 of the Treaty.  
8.  “Party” means a Party to this 
Treaty.  
9.  “Conference of the Parties” 
means the Conference of the     
Parties to this Treaty.  
10.  “Secretary-General” means 
the Secretary-General of the    
Pacific Islands Development     
Forum.  
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COMMENTARY 
(1)  The  Article  starts  by  suggesting  that  the  definitions  contained  i n  Article  1  
of  the UNFCCC apply mutatis mutandis  to the Pacific Climate Treaty. Article 1 of the 
UNFCCC defines  key  terms  ranging  from  ‘emissions’  and  ‘climate  system’  to  
‘adverse  effects  of climate  change’.  Particularly  noteworthy  is  the  definition  of  
‘climate  change’,  which makes it clear that climate change is human-made and in 
addition to natural variability. The Article 1 definitions similarly apply to the Kyoto 
Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Incorporating  these promote  consistency        
between  the complementary regional initiative.  
(2) The definition of ‘sustainable development’ is taken from the World Commission 
on Environment and Development ’s 1987 report ‘Our Common Future’, also known 
as the Brundtland report. The report was written after three years of public hearings 
and is based  on  over  five  hundred  written  submissions.  The  landmark  definition  
from  the report remains the most frequently quoted definition of sustainable       
development. 
(3) The definition of ‘territory’ is taken from Article 1(b) of the South Pacific Nuclear 
Free Zone Treaty. As the definition is broad, it ensures that the potential geographical 
scope  of  the  treaty  is  nearly  a  fifth  of  the  Earth’s  surface.  This  geographical  
coverage particularly  increases  the  impacts,  including  symbolic  impact,  of  the  
ban  on  new  coal mines and exploration for fossil fuels: it disproves the widely held 
assumption that fossil fuel production and consumption are legal, normal and permis-
sible. 
(4)  The  definition  of  ‘human  rights’  is  formulated  so  that  it  covers  at  least  all  
human rights  enshrined  in  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  without  
creating  new human rights obligations for Parties. This prevents a situation where a 
Party could incur, by implication, obligations under human rights treaties it has not 
ratified. At the  same time,  all  human  rights  that  are  internationally  recognised  as  
being  affected  by  climate change are within the scope of the Treaty. The right to 
enjoy a distinct culture--which is  particularly  important  in  light  of  the  range  of  
threats  climate  change   poses  to communities in the Pacific—is also within the 
scope of the Treaty, as it is incorporated in Article 27 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which is widely understood to reflect customary   
international law. 
(5) The definition of ‘loss and damage’ is broad and inclusive, in accordance with 
PSDIS’ positions on loss and damage in climate change negotiations under the UN-
FCCC. The definition makes it clear that loss and damage is distinct from mitigation 
and adaptation; it concerns residual negative effects of climate change. The definition 
is also sufficiently broad to encompass slow-onset and extreme weather events, 
which is in line with Article 8 of the Paris Agreement. As there is, as yet, no agreed 
definition of ‘loss and damage’ under  the  UNFCCC  regime,  the  definition  in  the  
Pacific  Climate  Treaty  could  have significant influence on international discussions 
and policy-making on loss and damage, including the work of the Warsaw Interna-
tional Mechanism on Loss and Damage.  
(6)  Another gap in international law is the lack of norms and rules on climate-induced  
displacement and migration.  
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The definition of ‘climate-induced migration’ included in the  Treaty borrows from a wealth of academic literature on ‘climate 
refugees’, and has been adjusted to ensure that the Treaty’s provisions on this important matter cover: i) internally displaced 
persons and persons who cross borders; ii) involuntary and  voluntary displacement  or  migration;  and  (iii)  permanent  and  
temporary  relocation. The distinguishing  parameter  for  the  definition  is  that  climate  change  is  the  cause  of relocation. The 
advantage of this inclusive definition is ensuring that different categories of people who migrate as a result of climate change will 
receive, at least in principle, the same levels of protection. The potential drawback of the definition is that it is difficult to          
distinguish  climate-induced  displacement  from  migration  triggered by  political, economic  or  other  factors.  However,  this  
difficulty  could  be  resolved,  at  least  to  an extent, on a case-by-case basis in light of scientific and other evidence. And again, 
the absence of an agreed definition of ‘climate-induced migration’ means that the definition contained  in  this  Treaty  could  
help  shape  international  discussions  and  policy-making, including  the  work  of  the  task  force  mandated  by  the  Paris      
decision  to  ‘develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the 
adverse effects of climate change’. 
 
(7)  The  Treaty  defines  ‘compensation’  simply  as  ‘money  awarded  to  person(s)  or nation(s) who suffer loss and damage’. 
This definition builds on the assumption that at least some greenhouse gas pollution can be qualified as, or linked to wrongful or 
illegal conduct,  which  results  in  an  obligation  for  the  responsible  actor  to  rectify  the consequences  of  the  conduct.  It  
should  be  noted  that  under  international  law, compensation is just one form of remedies that can be awarded to beneficiaries 
of an obligation  who  are  affected  (‘injured’)  by  wrongful  conduct.  The  principal  obligations arising from wrongful conduct 
are (i) to stop the wrongful conduct and (ii) ‘as far as possible,  wipe  out  all  the  consequences  of  the  illegal  act  and                 
re-establish  the  situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed’. The need  for,  and  
right  to,  compensation  arises  from  the  reality  that  most  damage  to  the climate system is of an irreversible nature.           
Accordingly, restoring or replacing rights that have been violated as a result of climate change is not always possible. Compensa-
tion is a second-best  response  to  violations,  which  can  rectify  some  of  the  harm  done  to  the victims of climate change and 
provide the means for new opportunities. 
(8)  The  final  four  definitions  in  the  Treaty  concern  administrative  and  institutional arrangements. The ‘Fund administrator’ 
referred to in Article 9 of the Treaty is, as per that Article, the PIDF. 
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ARTICLE 2.  PURPOSE 
1.  The purpose of this Treaty is to achieve sustainable development while strengthening national, regional and global responses 
to the threat of climate change, including by:  
(a)  Pursuing all possible efforts to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 1.5°C above pre-industrial 
levels;  
(b)  Ensuring and maintaining universal access to sufficient amounts of clean and affordable energy for all Pacific islanders and 
for a growing productive sector;  
(c)  Increasing our ability to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change and foster climate resilience and sustainable          
development, in a manner that does not threaten food production;  
(d)  Preventing, minimising and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change;  
(e)  Protecting the sovereign rights of all Pacific Small Island Developing States in the face of threats posed by climate change;  
(f)  Making  finance  flows  consistent  with  a  pathway  towards  sustainable  and climate-resilient development, adaptation 
and compensation for loss and damage.  
2.  This Treaty will be implemented in accordance with international law, including the precautionary principle, the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, the polluter pays principle and human rights, including 
cultural rights and the rights of indigenous peoples.  
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 ARTICLE 3.  PHASING OUT FOSSIL FUELS 
 
1.  The Parties are committed to a global greenhouse gas emissions pathway that keeps global average temperature rise well    
below 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Accordingly, Parties shall take steps to achieve, and promote:  
(a)  Global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible;  
(b)  Rapid  reductions  of  greenhouse  gas  emissions  thereafter,  in  accordance  with  the best available science;  
(c)  Zero global emissions no later than 2050.  
COMMENTARY 
(1)  The  chapeau  of  the  first  paragraph  of  Article  2  states  that  the  Treaty  aims  at  the achievement of    
sustainable development while strengthening responses to the threat of climate change at the national, regional 
and global level. The simultaneous focus on these three levels is a distinctive feature of the Treaty, which sets it 
apart from most regional treaties  and from international  treaties—including  the  UNFCCC  and  the  Paris    
Agreement—which focus primarily on global responses.  
 
 
(2)  The remainder of paragraph 1 resembles Article 2(1) of the Paris Agreement--which sets out the purpose of that               
instrument—but is more comprehensive, and tailored to the needs and priorities of PSIDS. Subparagraph 1(a) reflects what 
PSIDS would have liked to see in Article 2(1)(a) of the Paris Agreement, which sets an ambiguously phrased long term tempera-
ture goal of ‘holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below  2°C  above  pre-industrial  levels  and  to  
pursue  efforts  to  limit  the  temperature increase  to  1.5°C  above  pre-industrial  levels,  recognizing  that  this  would         
significantly reduce  the  risks  and  impacts  of  climate  change’.  This  Article  of  the  Pacific  Climate Treaty makes it clear that 
1.5°C remains the upper limit for temperature rise from the perspective  of  PSIDS.  Subparagraph  1(b)  sets  an  ambitious  
goal  of  ensuring  and maintaining universal access to sufficient amounts of clean and affordable energy for all Pacific islanders 
and for a growing productive sector—a goal which is operationalised in Article  4.  Subparagraph  1(c)  reflects  Article  2(1)(b)  
of  the  Paris  Agreement  with  ‘low greenhouse  gas  emissions  development’  replaced  by  the  broader  term  ‘sustainable 
development’. Subparagraphs 1(d) and 1(e) respectively add ‘preventing, minimising and addressing loss and damage’ and 
‘protecting the sovereign rights of all Pacific Small Island Developing States’ to the purpose of the Treaty, reflecting the          
importance of these issues to PSIDS. Subparagraph 1(f) reflects Article 2(1)(c) of the Paris Agreement, but ‘adaptation’ and 
‘compensation’ are added in accordance with Pacific priorities. 
(3) Paragraph 2 of Article 2 clarifies that the Treaty complements rather than replaces existing international law, and highlights 
international law principles that are particularly important  to  PSIDS.  It  recites  the  principle  of  ‘common  but  differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities’ as contained in the UNFCCC, instead of the diluted version of the principle included 
in Article 2(2) of the Paris Agreement. Finally, the  paragraph  mentions  ‘human  rights,  including  cultural  rights  and  the  
rights  of indigenous peoples’. This substitutes, at least at the regional level, a provision that was included  in  early  drafts  of  
the  Paris  Agreement  but  deleted  in  later  drafts  following opposition from a select number of countries. The Pacific Climate 
Treaty reflects the call from indigenous peoples, civil society and Pacific leaders for provisions that ensure respect  for  human  
rights  and  the  rights  of  indigenous  peoples  in  all  climate  change related actions. 
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2.  In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal, each Party undertakes:  
(a)  Not to permit the opening of new coal or fossil fuel mines in its territory;  
(b)  Not to take any action to assist or encourage the opening of new coal or fossil fuel mines in the territory of any other 
State;  
(c)  To take steps to achieve the closure of any existing coal or fossil fuel mine in its territory as soon as practicable and appro-
priate;  
(d)  To  encourage  the  closure  of  existing  coal  and  fossil  fuel  mines  in  the  territories  of other States;  
(e) Not to provide any subsidies for fossil fuel production or consumption.  
 
 
 
3.  The Parties shall strengthen their cooperation on the phasing out of fossil fuels, including through sharing information, best 
practices, experiences and lessons learned in designing and implementing mitigation plans and accessing finance for alternatives 
to fossil fuels. 
 
COMMENTARY 
(1)  Article  3  is  at  the  heart  of  the  Pacific  Climate  Treaty:  it  demonstrates  Pacific leadership in tackling the root causes of 
climate change. Paragraph 1 sets the stage by sketching  out  a  global  emissions  pathway  that  is  compatible  with  the  long-
term temperature goal of keeping warming below 1.5°C. In this sense, it ‘corrects’ Article 4(1) of  the  PA,  which  is  insufficiently  
ambitious  to  be  compatible  with  this  goal.  Most significant here is subparagraph (c), which calls for ‘zero emissions’ rather 
than ‘a balance between emissions by sources and removals by sinks’. This language is preferable given the inherent danger of an 
approach that allows for the continuation of emissions, and the desirability  of  achieving  negative  rather  than  net-zero  emis-
sions.  It  also  replaces  the dangerously vague deadline of ‘in the second half of this century’ by a firm deadline of ‘no later than 
2050’, which gives the world a much better shot at staying below 1.5°C.  
(2)  Paragraph  2  is  one  of  the  most  ground-breaking  features  of  the  Treaty.  This paragraph makes the Treaty the first-ever 
legal instrument to impose a ban on new coal and fossil fuel mines (subparagraph a), setting a bold example for the rest of the 
world. Parties to the Treaty also commit not to assist or encourage the opening of new coal or fossil fuel mines elsewhere 
(subparagraph b), while taking steps to achieve the closure of any  existing  coal  or  fossil  fuel  mines  in  their  own  territories  
as  soon  as  possible (subparagraph  c)  and  encouraging  the  closure  of  existing  coal  and  fossil  fuel  mines elsewhere 
(subparagraph d). In addition, the Treaty poses an absolute ban on fossil fuel subsidies (subparagraph e). With this package of 
provisions aimed at phasing out fossil fuels  as  soon  as  practically  possible,  Pacific  leaders  would  show  unique  leadership  in 
actually aligning laws and policies with a 1.5°C pathway.  
(3)  Finally,  paragraph  3  contains  a  broad  provision  which  commits  Parties  to strengthening  cooperation  on  the  phasing  
out  of  fossil  fuels.  Amongst  the  areas envisaged for cooperation is accessing finance for mitigation. Accordingly, the provision 
encourages Parties to learn from each other in overcoming obstacles to climate finance, minimising overheads, increasing      
transparency and establishing national institutions for direct access. Bringing this cooperation within the scope of the Treaty    
solidifies the role of PIDF as the main forum for regional cooperation on climate change.  
 
ARTICLE 4.  SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
1.  The Parties shall take action, individually and jointly, to ensure universal access to sufficient amounts of clean and affordable 
energy for all Pacific islanders and for a growing productive sector by 2030, and to maintain such access thereafter.  
2.  A Pacific Framework for Renewable Energy is hereby established, with a view to achieving the objective set out in paragraph 1, 
in collaboration with development partners.  
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COMMENTARY 
(1)  Article  4  sets  an  ambitious  objective  of  achieving  universal  access  to  clean  and affordable  energy  by  2030  and       
maintaining  such  access  thereafter.  This  objective corresponds  in  part  with  that  of  United  Nations  Secretary-General  
Bank  Ki-moon’s Sustainable Energy for All (SE4all) initiative, which aims at achieving universal access to modern energy          
services  by  2030.  It  also  aligns  with  Sustainable  Development  Goal (SDG) 7 on affordable and clean energy. However,      
neither the SE4all initiative nor SDG 7 sets  a definite target for clean energy, instead aiming at a ‘substantial increase’ in the 
share  of  renewable  energy  in  the  global  energy  mix  by  2030. For  the  Pacific, leapfrogging  to  clean  energy  access  has  a  
range  of  advantages:  apart  from  the environmental and climate impacts avoided, an ambitious renewable energy framework 
should  enable  PSIDS  to  access  climate  finance  for  projects  with  economy-wide development gains.  
 
(2) Paragraph 2 establishes a Pacific Framework for Renewable Energy. This framework could draw inspiration from the Africa   
Renewable Energy Initiative launched by African leaders at COP21 in Paris, which sets similar renewable energy objectives for the 
African region. As details for this framework are most appropriately worked out at the policy level,  and  given  the  need  to  align  
the  Framework  with  existing  initiatives  related  to renewable energy, no details about the Framework are included in the Treaty. 
Instead, the  Pacific  Climate  Change  Commission  is  mandated  to  support  Parties  in  the formulation and implementation of 
the Framework.  
 
 
Article 5. ADAPTATION 
3.  The Parties shall take action to strengthen resilience, reduce vulnerability and adapt to climate change in a country-driven, com-
munity-based, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent manner, taking into account the best available science, tradi-
tional knowledge and human rights.  
4.  The Parties shall strengthen their cooperation on adaptation, including through sharing information, best practices, experiences 
and lessons learned in designing and implementing adaptation plans and accessing finance for adaptation.  
5.  The Conference of the Parties may decide to take actions, as appropriate, to strengthen institutional arrangements to facilitate 
cooperation on adaptation.  
 
COMMENTARY 
(1)  In  line  with  the  preambular  statement  that  adaptation  is  ‘a  matter  of  survival’, adaptation features  prominently in the 
Treaty. Paragraph 1 of Article 5 commits Parties to ‘take action to strengthen resilience, reduce vulnerability and adapt to climate 
change’. 
The language on the modalities of such action draws on paragraphs 7(1) and 7(5) of the Paris Agreement, both of which are strong 
provisions that broadly reflect the position of PSIDS.  The words ‘community-based’ and ‘human rights’ are added here to reflect 
the importance of community -based adaptation and human rights protection for individuals, communities  and  leaders  in  PSIDS,  
while  phrases  such  as  ‘as  appropriate’  are  not included to avoid weakening the commitment. 
(2)  Paragraph  2  calls  for  strengthened  cooperation  between  Parties  on  adaptation, mirroring paragraph 3 of Article 3 on Miti-
gation. The overlap between these provisions would  allow  for  clustered  discussions  on  related  issues,  for  example  ‘sharing  
best practices  in  accessing  finance  for  mitigation  and  adaptation’.  Again,  the  provision underscores the importance of PIDF as 
the main Pacific forum for regional cooperation on climate change.  
(3) Although the Treaty does not create new institutions on adaptation, the door to new institutions  is  kept  open  through  para-
graph  3.  Accordingly,  Parties  could  consider strengthening  institutional  arrangements  on  issues  such  as  access  to  climate  
finance—including, for example, the creation of a  Pacific Mechanism for Financing Adaptation—should  the  need  to  do  so  arise.  
The  modalities  for  taking  such  action  would  be determined by the Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the Parties.  
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Article 6. LOSS AND DAMAGE 
1.  The Parties shall take steps, individually and jointly, to prevent, minimise and address loss and damage associated with the 
adverse effects of climate change, including its economic and noneconomic aspects.  
2.  The Parties shall take steps, individually and jointly, to prevent involuntary migration as a result of the adverse effects of      
climate change.  
3.  The Parties shall cooperate to enable individuals and communities who are severely affected or threatened by the adverse 
effects of climate change to migrate with dignity. Accordingly, Parties undertake:  
(a)  To  establish  a  Pacific  Framework  for  Climate  Mobility  to  facilitate  internal  and cross-border movement in the context 
of climate change;  
(b)  To ensure the protection of Pacific heritage, cultures and languages in the context of climate-induced migration;  
(c) To cooperate with other States on arrangements that will enable individuals and communities in Pacific Small Island            
Developing States to migrate with dignity, temporarily or permanently, to a location where all of their human rights are      
optimally protected.  
4.  The Parties shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the human rights of those who are forced to flee from the     
adverse effects of climate change are protected at all times.  
COMMENTARY 
(1)  Again, the Treaty’s provision on loss and damage reflects the preambular  statement that loss and damage is ‘a matter of  
survival’. It starts with a broad provision in which Parties commit to ‘prevent, minimise and address loss and damage’ individually 
as well as jointly. Paragraph 1 makes it clear that both economic and non -economic aspects are to be  addressed.  This  provision  
goes  beyond  the  obligations  related  to  loss  and  damage created under the Paris Agreement, but since most PSIDS are       
already taking the steps envisaged  by  the  Article  the  inclusion  of  this  provision  mainly  serves  to  highlight  the importance 
of this matter to the region.  
 
(2)  Paragraph  2  mirrors  paragraph  1  of  this  Article,  but  focuses  on  climate-induced migration. Again, most PSIDS are      
already taking the steps envisaged by this provision—in a sense, all mitigation and most adaptation measures contribute to the 
prevention of involuntary  migration.  The  significance  of  placing this  provision  on  prevention  before the subsequent provi-
sions on ‘migration with dignity’ is to avoid giving the impression that  climate  change-induced  migration  is  an  acceptable  
‘effect’  of  climate  change.  The inclusion  of  this  topic  under  ‘loss  and  damage’,  after  ‘mitigation’  and  ‘adaptation’,         
confirms  that  it  is  a  last resort  measure  that  nonetheless  requires  planning,  action and cooperation.  
 
(3) Paragraph 3 establishes a Pacific Framework for Climate Mobility to facilitate internal and cross-border movement in the    
context of climate change. The details of this Framework are to be worked out by the COP with assistance from the Pacific       
Islands Climate Commission, but this paragraph creates a basis  –  with legal force  –  for filling an  important  gap  on  the  protec-
tion  of  climate  migrants  or  climate  ‘refugees’.  This answers to repeated calls from a network of intergovernmental and non-
governmental organisations  and  agencies,  the  Pacific  Network  on  Climate  Change  Migration, Displacement  and  Resettle-
ment, to  establish  a  framework  for  the  governance  of climate-induced displacement, resettlement and migration. The Pacific 
Islands Climate Commission could collaborate with PSIDS governments, members of this Network and other relevant stakehold-
ers to ensure the effective governance of the increased mobility of the Pacific people in the face of future climate  impacts. The 
Commission would also be ideally placed to help shape the work of the task force established under the Paris Decision to 
‘develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse effects 
of climate change and further work on this issue under the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage.  
 
(4)  Subparagraph  3(b)  commits  Parties  to  ‘ensure  the  protection  of  Pacific  heritage, cultures and languages in the context 
of climate-induced migration’. This is in line with the Treaty’s focus on human rights, including the right to enjoy a distinct culture 
and the right of self-determination. The threat of losing aspects of Pacific cultures as a result of climate change is one of the non-
economic aspects of loss and damage the Treaty seeks to  address.  Parties  could  cooperate  on  this  aspect  through  the       
Pacific  Framework  for Climate Mobility, although the provision is flexible and provides Parties with discretion on how to cooper-
ate and take action. 
 
(5)  Subparagraph 3(c) calls on Parties to ‘cooperate with other States on arrangements that  will  enable  individuals  and        
communities  to  migrate  with  dignity,  temporarily  or permanently, to a location where all of their human rights are optimally 
protected’. This cooperation  could  take  place  within  the  above-mentioned  task  force  of  the  Warsaw International  Mecha-
nism  on  Loss  and  Damage,  in  other  appropriate  forums  or bilaterally.  The  provision  is  broadly  formulated,  thus  enabling  
innovate  and  ambitious action  to  deal  with  climate-induced  migration.  At  the  same  time,  the  focus  on  human rights    
ensures that the best interests of those who are migrating will be at the centre of the envisaged arrangements.  
 
(6)  Paragraph 4 of the Article adds another provision to guarantee  the protection of the human rights of those who are forced to 
flee from the adverse effects of climate change. The significance of the provision is not only in this human rights protection, but 
also in the use of the phrase ‘flee from the adverse effects  of climate change’ which ensures that the Treaty keeps the door open 
to protection of the rights of climate migrants through measures under international refugee law. 
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 ARTICLE 7. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 
1.  The territories of Pacific Small Island Developing States shall forever belong to present and future generations of 
the Pacific Island peoples.  
2.  In  no  case  may  a  Pacific  Small  Island  Developing  State be  deprived  of  any  of  its  sovereign rights under 
international law as a direct or indirect result of climate change.  
3.  The Parties shall cooperate to ensure the protection and continuation of all legal  rights related to sovereignty in 
the face of threats posed by climate change.  
 
COMMENTARY 
(1) Article 7 deals with one of the major concern of PSIDS in relation to climate change, namely the potential legal implications of 
loss of territory as a result  of climate change. The three provisions of this article make it clear that Pacific Island peoples and 
PSIDS are not surrendering any rights, even in the event that one or more PSIDS would lose all of its land territory. Paragraph 1 
deals with one of the most fundamental rights, namely the right of peoples to their own territory. This right can be seen as a   
component of the right of self-determination, which entitles peoples to ‘for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth 
and resources.’ And by virtue of the right of self-determination, a people may ‘in no case ... be deprived of its own means of sub-
sistence’. It should be noted that ‘territory’ is broadly defined in this Treaty, covering internal waters, territorialsea  and           
archipelagic  waters,  the  seabed  and  subsoil  beneath,  the  land  territory  and airspace above them (Article 1), and thus the 
scope of paragraph 1 is sufficiently broad to protect  at  least  some  aspects  of  the  right  of  self-determination  in  the  face  of  
climate change.  At  the  same  time,  the  loss  of  land  territory  could  constitute  a  deprivation  or violation  of  the  right  of  
self-determination,  and  fall  within  the  scope  of  the  Loss  and Damage provisions of the Treaty. The provisions in Article 7 
serve to minimise the loss in terms of legal rights of Pacific Island peoples and States. 
(2) Paragraphs 2 and 3 focus on the rights of PSIDS under international law. Given the myriad  of  uncertainties  surrounding  the  
implications  of  the  loss  of  land  territory  for rights and duties associated with statehood, it is important that PSIDS take 
measures to protect  their  rights  in  the  face  of  climate  change.  Paragraph  2  makes  it  clear  that according to PSIDS, it is 
legally impossible for climate change-related threats to deprive PSIDS of any of its sovereign rights under international law. Again, 
this makes it clear that as far as  PSIDS are  concerned, no rights are  being surrendered as a  result of the direct or indirect       
impacts of climate change.  
(3) Paragraph 3 recognises the reality that solemn declarations about the continuation of rights will not suffice to protect those 
rights. PSIDS would need to work cooperatively with  other  States,  including  through  relevant  international  forums,  to  ensure  
that  their legal  rights  are  protected  in  practice,  even  in  worst  case  scenarios.  This  paragraph commits Parties to do exactly 
that, without being prescriptive as to the strategies to be used. Again, the Pacific Islands Climate Commission could be asked   
provide guidance on relevant forums that could be approached (e.g. the UN Human Rights Council, the UN General Assembly, the 
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, the International Court  of  Justice)  and  associated  strategies  and  outcomes  (e.g.  
seeking  declarations, resolutions, advisory opinions or binding judgments).  
 
Article 8. ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
1.  The Parties shall take steps to eliminate obstacles to redress for loss and damage caused by climate change within their        
jurisdictions.  
2.  In addition and without prejudice to paragraph 1 above, each Party shall ensure that, where they meet the criteria, if any, laid 
down in its national law, members of the public have access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and        
omissions by private persons which contravene provisions of national, regional or international law relating to the protection of 
the global climate.  
3.  Each Party shall take steps, within the framework of its national legislation, to enable domestic courts to make an order for 
damages claimed on behalf of the public to be paid into the Pacific Islands Climate Compensation Fund.  
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 COMMENTARY 
(1) Article 8 of the Treaty aims to make it easier for Pacific island communities affected by climate change to claim 
compensation through the domestic court system. At the face of  it,  one  key  obstacle  to  successful  climate  
change  litigation  is  that  the  actors  most responsible for climate change – such as big fossil fuel companies – are 
often based outside  the  jurisdiction  of  PSIDS.  This  obstacle  is,  however,  not  insurmountable,  as jurisdiction can 
be established based on the location of the damages. The adoption of domestic legislation could help eliminate other 
obstacles while clarifying the law related to climate change litigation. 
 
 
(2) Paragraph 1 calls on Parties to review and, if necessary, amend national legislation to minimise  jurisdictional  and  other        
obstacles  to  climate  change  litigation  against  foreign actors.  This  could  open  the  door  to  potentially  ground-breaking  cases  
resulting  in compensation  for  climate  damages.  An  advantage  of  this  avenue  to  climate compensation is that PSIDS govern-
ments will not need to get involved in climate change litigation against governments who are also providers of humanitarian and 
development assistance and climate finance: compensation would be obtained directly by communities from  some  of  the  major  
corporate  polluters.  In  addition,  successful  litigation  against companies could lead to payments into the Pacific Islands Climate 
Compensation Fund, which could be used by governments for mitigation, adaptation and addressing loss and damage in accordance 
with Article 8(2)(c) of the Treaty. (2) The provision in paragraph 2 is aimed at enabling members of the public to challenge the legali-
ty of acts that contribute to climate change even if no damage has been suffered. This will enable the public to acts as a ‘watchdog’ 
for compliance with international and regional  climate  change  law,  and  with  domestic  legislation  adopted  to  implement  this 
Treaty.  Making  this  subject  to  criteria  laid  down  in  national  law  clarifies  that  the provision does not prescribe or require 
sweeping reforms to the justice system.  
 
(3)  Paragraph  3  requires  Parties  to  take  steps,  within  the  framework  of  national legislation, to enable domestic courts to 
make and order for damages claimed on behalf of  the  public  to  be  paid  into  the  Pacific  Islands  Climate  Compensation  Fund.  
Most courts will already have the discretion to make such orders under existing laws, based on the absence of explicit   restrictions 
to do so. In such cases, PSIDS governments would only  need  to  build  awareness  of  the  Fund  among  the judiciary.  However,  
some governments may want to lay down specific procedures in legislation to promote the use of  the  Fund.  The  Pacific  Islands  
Climate  Commission  and  PIDF  could  lead  capacity building initiatives for Parties, and possibly even for members of the judiciary, 
to help draw connections between domestic legal systems and the Fund.  
 
 
Article 9. PACIFIC ISLANDS CLIMATE COMPENSATION FUND 
 
1.  A Pacific Islands Climate Compensation Fund is hereby established.  
2. The Fund shall be held in trust for:  
(a)  Assistance and compensation for communities who have suffered climate change-related losses, including loss of food crops, 
fresh water sources, housing or land;  
(b)  Other actions related to mitigation, sustainable development, adaptation, loss and damage or climate-induced migration  taken 
in accordance with Articles 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this Treaty; and  
(c)  Such other purposes related to compensation for climate change and climate damages as may be specified in further decisions 
of the Conference of the Parties.  
3.  The Fund shall be administered by the Secretariat of the Pacific Islands Development Forum on behalf of the Parties.  
 
COMMENTARY 
(1)  The establishment of a Pacific Islands Climate Compensation Fund is another innovative feature of the Treaty. Although there is 
a precedent for establishing a ‘Climate Resilient  Fund’  at  the  national  level, there  is  currently  no  existing  Climate Compensa-
tion  Fund  with  a  mandate  to  receive  funds  not  only  through  voluntary donations,  but  also  through  court orders following  
successful  climate  change  litigation against actors with significant historical responsibility for climate change. The provisions of  
this  Article  are  loosely  based  on  similar  provisions  in  a  civil  society  proposal  for  a Climate Compensation Act, which could be 
adopted at the domestic level.  
 
(2)  Paragraph  2  clarifies  that  the  Fund  would  be  held  in  trust  for  a  wide  range  of purposes,  including  assistance  and     
compensation  for  communities  who  have  suffered climate-related  losses  and  ‘other  actions  related  to  mitigation,  adapta-
tion,  loss  and damage or climate-induced migration taken in accordance with Articles 3-7 of this Treaty’. This covers much ground 
already, and could be broadened further through COP decisions as per subparagraph 2(d). The rationale for this broad range of     
purposes is that some  cases  will  beg  for  remedies  to  be  provided  directly  to  victims,  while  in  other cases—e.g. ‘public inter-
est’ litigation—remedies that benefit the public at large would be appropriate.  The  links  to  Articles  3-7  further  ensure  that  the  
Pacific  Islands  Climate Compensation  Fund  could  effectively  serve  as  a funding mechanism  for  the implementation of the   
Treaty. Paragraph 3 mandates the Secretariat of PIDF to act as the Administrator of the Fund on behalf of the Parties.  
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 Article 10. CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES 
1.  A Conference of the Parties is hereby established.  
2.  The Conference of the Parties shall keep under regular review the implementation of the Treaty, and shall make, 
within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Treaty. 
 
 
 
3.  The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, adopt its own rules of procedure.  
4.  An annual session of the Conference of the Parties shall be convened immediately preceding or following the regular meeting 
of the Leaders‟ Council. 
5.  Additional sessions may be convened at the request of three or more Parties. Such requests shall be communicated to the 
Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Development Forum who will inform the Parties.  
6.  Any  external  party  with  a  formal  status  conferred  upon  it  by  the  Pacific  Islands Development Forum may attend, as an 
observer, the sessions referred to in this Article.  
7.  An external party without a formal status conferred upon it by the Pacific Islands Development Forum may be invited to the 
sessions referred to in this Article upon admission by the Conference of the Parties.  
8.  The  admission  and  participation  of  participants  shall  be  subject  to  the  rules  of  procedure adopted by the Conference of 
the Parties.  
9.  The Pacific Islands Development Forum shall provide secretariat services for implementing the provisions of this Article.  
  
COMMENTARY 
 
(1)  Article  10  establishes a Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Treaty. Paragraph 2 stipulates  that  the  main  functions  of  
the  COP  are  to  ‘keep  under  regular  review  the implementation of the Treaty’ and to ‘make, within its mandate, the decisions 
necessary to  promote  the  effective  implementation  of  the  treaty’.  This  provision  mirrors  Article 7(2) of the UNFCCC which 
establishes the Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC as the ‘supreme body’ of the Convention. For this Treaty, however, the COP 
is not specifically called the ‘supreme body’ of the Treaty as the Pacific Islands Climate Commission has an equally important role 
to play in the treaty regime. The provision is also less detailed than the  comparable  provision  of  the  UNFCCC  to  allow  Parties  
flexibility  in  shaping   the regime. PIDF is tasked with providing secretariat services for the COP, as per paragraph 10 of this     
Article.  
(2)  Paragraph  3  mandates  the  COP  to  adopt  its  own  rules  of  procedure  at  its  first session.  This  provision  resembles      
Article  7(3)  of  the  UNFCCC,  but  again  allows  for more flexibility as to what kind of rules the Parties wish to adopt. It should be 
noted here that disagreement between Parties to the UNFCCC about decision-making procedures for the adoption of particular 
decisions has prevented the Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC  from  adopting  its  own  rules  of  procedure,  and  ‘adoption  
of  the  rules  of procedure’ is accordingly still on the agenda in that forum. PSIDS have not been able to achieve a unified stance 
on this issue, with some pressing hard for the adoption of a rule that would allow decisions to be adopted by voting and others 
showing reluctance to change  the  current  practice  of  decisions  being  adopted  by  consensus. The  issue  of decision-making 
might be easier to resolve at the regional level, but PSIDS and PIDF would nonetheless do well to set the stage for a productive 
discussion on this issue in advance of the first session of the COP. For example, PIDF could consider preparing, in consultation  
with  Parties,  draft  rules  of  procedure  ahead  of  the  first  session.  Actually adopting the rules of procedure at the first session 
would show political leadership and commitment that has been lacking at the international level. 
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(3) Paragraph 4 provides that the COP shall meet annually and ‘immediately preceding or following the regular meeting of the 
Leaders’ Council’. This mirrors Article V of the Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of 
Common Interest (‘Nauru Agreement’), which provides that Parties shall meet annually before or after meetings of the South 
Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency. Like the Nauru Agreement, this Treaty seeks to minimise the burden of meetings on Pacific 
leaders.  
 
(4) Paragraph 5 provides for extraordinary sessions that may be convened at the request of  three  or  more  Parties.  This   
mirrors  Article  V of  the  Nauru  Agreement,  and  differs from the comparable provision in the UNFCCC which requires        
support from at least one third of the Parties for  an extraordinary  session  to be granted. The  present provision prevents the 
COP  from having to  vote on  the request, building  on the assumption  that  holding  an  extraordinary  session  will  be  
worthwhile  if  three  or  more Parties decide to put forward a request. 
 
 
(6) Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8, which deal with the participation of external parties, reflect the spirit  of  multi-stakeholder  engage-
ment  championed  by  PIDF.  The  preamble  of  the Treaty specifically recognises ‘the importance of engaging, as equal partners, 
civil society, women, youth and persons with disabilities, in all efforts towards building climate change resilience’. Accordingly, 
the Treaty allows external parties to engage with the Conference of  the  Parties  as  ‘participants’,  in  contrast  with  the  UNFCCC  
which  limits  the  role  of external parties to that of ‘observers’. Paragraph 6 and 7 set out how ‘participant’ status can  be        
acquired,  with  paragraph 6  seeking  to  capitalise  on  the  broad  group  of stakeholders  already  engaged  in  the  work  of  
PIDF  by  enabling  those  stakeholders  to attend  the  sessions  of  the  COP  without  needing  to  apply  for  additional  accredita-
tion. And paragraph 7 enables external parties without a formal status conferred upon it by PIDF to apply for accreditation to the 
COP. This paragraph creates another avenue for external  parties  to  attend  COP  sessions,  and  also  provides  the  COP  with  a       
degree  of autonomy in admitting  participants.  Paragraph  8  implies  that  the  COP  will  include provisions on the admission of 
participants in its rules of procedure. 
 
Article 11. PACIFIC ISLANDS CLIMATE COMMISSION 
1.  A Pacific Islands Climate Commission, hereinafter called “the Commission”, is hereby established.  
2. The Commission shall have a mandate to:  
(a)  Promote Pacific values associated with the purpose of this Treaty;  
(b)  Support the Parties in the implementation of all aspects of the Treaty;  
(c)  Oversee the realisation and implementation of the Pacific Framework for Renewable Energy;  
(d)  Oversee the realisation and implementation of the Pacific Framework for Climate Mobility Pacific Framework for Climate Mo-
bility, including a rights-based approach to “migration with dignity‟;  
(e)  Cooperate with other Pacific and international institutions on matters relevant to the purpose of this Treaty;  
(f)  Perform any other tasks which may be entrusted to it by the Conference of the Parties.  
3.  The  Pacific  Islands  Development  Forum  shall  provide  the  services  necessary  for  the effective discharge of the duties of 
the Commission.  
4. The Commission shall adopt its own rules of procedure. 
 
 
COMMENTARY 
(1)  Article  10  establishes  a  Pacific  Islands  Climate  Commission  and  provides  some elements of its potential mandate. These 
elements are laid down in subparagraphs 2(a)-(e), with subparagraph (f) allowing for further extension of the Commission’s    
mandate through decisions of the COP.  
(2) The promotion of Pacific values associated with the purpose of the Treaty would be one of the core elements of the           
Commission’s mandate. This could involve, for example, undertaking  studies,  organising  seminars,  symposia  and  conferences  
and  disseminating information on matters relevant to the purpose of the Treaty. This part of the mandate could  also  form  the  
basis  for  activities  undertaken  under  other  parts  of  the  mandate: studying and discussing an issue is often a useful way to  
kick-start other types of work, including support and advocacy. Input from other stakeholders, as well as Parties, could be encour-
aged by issuing calls for written input as soon as the Commission decides to study, discuss or disseminate information on an      
issue. 
(3)  Another  important  aspect  of  the  Commission’s  mandate  would  be  supporting  the Parties on matters relevant to the 
implementation of the Treaty. This could include, for example,  support  on  the  formulation  and  implementation  of  Nationally  
Determined Contributions (NDCs) to be submitted by Parties under the Paris Agreement, possibly in collaboration with PIDF, in a 
manner that reflects the Pacific priorities articulated in the Treaty. The Commission is also tasked with providing support to      
realise the formulation and implementation of the Pacific Framework for Renewable Energy established under Article  4(2)  and  
the  Pacific  Framework  for  Climate  Mobility  established  under  Article 6(3)(a). The Treaty does not prescribe the details on the 
type of oversight and support to be provided, leaving these to the COP to be determined.  
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(4)  The  Commission  is  explicitly  mandated  to  cooperate  with  other  Pacific  and international institutions on matters relat-
ed to the purpose of the Treaty (subparagraph e).  This  is  a  broad  provision  enabling  collaboration  with  a  wide  range  of  
institutions, ranging from the United Nations and the bodies  established under the UNFCCC to the Council  of  the  Regional  
Organisations  of  the  Pacific  (CROP)  agencies  and  local  and international  non-governmental  organisations.  This  provision  
would  help  avoid duplication  of  work  while  ensuring  productive  synergies  between  the  work  of  the Commission and 
that of relevant regional and international institutions.  
 
(5)  The  Treaty  does  not  prescribe  institutional  modalities  for  the  Commission. Accordingly, questions about the            
composition and membership of the Commission, the frequency  of  its  meetings  and  its  working  relationship  with  the  
COP  are  all  to  be resolved  by  Parties  themselves.  The  Treaty  does  stipulate  that  services  for  the Commission are to be 
provided for by PIDF (paragraph 3), and that the Commission is mandated to adopt its own rules of procedure (paragraph 4).  
 
Article 12. AMENDMENT 
The Conference of the Parties shall consider proposals for amendment of the provisions of the Treaty proposed by any Party and 
circulated by the Secretary-General to all Parties not less than three months prior to the convening of the session for this pur-
pose. Any proposal agreed upon by consensus by the Conference of the Parties shall be communicated to the Secretary General 
who shall circulate it for acceptance to all Parties. An amendment shall enter into force thirty days after receipt by the depositary 
of acceptance from all Parties. 
 
COMMENTARY 
(1) Article 12 on amendments mirrors  Article 11 of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, but here the mandate for consid-
ering proposals for amendments is with the COP while  the  Secretary-General  of  PIDF  is  tasked  with  communicating           
proposals  for amendments  to  the  Parties.  Amendments  would  only  gain  effect  if  adopted  by consensus, which ensures that 
all Parties will continue to support every provision of the Treaty even after an amendment. 
 
Article 13. SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION 
1.  The Treaty shall be open for signature by any State that is, or is eligible to be, a Member of the Pacific Island Development 
Forum.  
2.  The Treaty shall be subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary General who is 
hereby designated depositary of this Treaty and its Protocols.  
 
COMMENTARY 
(1) Article 13 deals with signature and ratification. Paragraph 1 draws on Article 12 of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, 
but Parties may include not only members of PIDF but also States that are eligible for membership. This provision ensure that the  
potential membership base of the Treaty is as broad as possible, yet confined to PSIDS. 
(2) Paragraph 2, which also draws on Article 12 of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,  provides  that  the  Treaty  is      
subject  to  ratification  and  stipulates  modalities.  It seems wise to require ratification of the Treaty rather than only a signature 
given the far-reaching implications of joining the Treaty, which beg for democratic buy-in prior to undertaking obligations. And 
with PSIDS leading the way in the ratification of the Paris Agreement, PSIDS  themselves  are  showing  that  ratification  of  a  
comprehensive  and important treaty does not necessarily need to be a lengthy process.  
(3) It must be noted that there are no provisions for withdrawal from the treaty. Thus, as opposed  to  the  South  Pacific  Nuclear  
Free  Zone  Treaty this  Treaty  does  not  give Parties the right to withdraw from the treaty upon a violation of the treaty by     
another Party.  Within  this  Treaty,  compliance  is  dealt  with  by  the  Pacific  Islands  Climate Commission in a quasi-judicial 
manner to avoid collapse of  the treaty regime in cases of non-compliance. The Treaty can also be contrasted with the UNFCCC on 
this point, which allows Parties to withdraw ‘at any time after three years from the date on which the Convention has entered 
into force for a Party’. This Treaty follows the convention of human rights treaties, most of which do not contain provisions for 
withdrawal in light of the importance of their subject matter.  
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Article 14. RESERVATIONS 
The Treaty shall not be subject to reservations. 
 
COMMENTARY 
(1) Article 14 prohibits reservations to the Treaty. This provision mirrors Article 14 of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone   
Treaty and Article 24 of the UNFCCC, Article 26 of the Kyoto Protocol and Article 27 of the Paris Agreement. The treaty regime 
would become  unnecessarily  complex,  and  could  be  weakened,  if  reservations  were  to  be allowed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 15. ENTRY INTO FORCE 
1.  The Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification.  
2.  For a signatory which ratifies the Treaty after the date of deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification, the Treaty shall enter 
into force on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification. 
 
COMMENTARY 
(1) Article 15 on entry into force mirrors Article 15 of  the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, but this Treaty would enter into 
force after five ratifications (as opposed to eight ratifications for entry into force of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty).  
The rationale for this comparatively low threshold is that there is likely to be more good faith among PSIDS eligible to become 
Parties to the Treaty, and PSIDS willing to join the Treaty regime are less likely to be deterred by the possibility of becoming, at 
least initially, one of a handful of States bound by the terms of the Treaty. In such a situation, rapid entry into force seems not 
only desirable but also possible. 
 
Article 16. DEPOSITARY FUNCTIONS 
The depositary shall register the Treaty and its Protocols pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and shall 
transmit certified copies of the Treaty and its Protocols to all Members of the Pacific Islands Development Forum and all States 
eligible to become Party to the Protocols to the Treaty and shall notify them of signatures and ratifications of the Treaty and its 
Protocols. 
 
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised by their Governments, have signed this Treaty. 
 
 
COMMENTARY 
(1)  Article  16  indicates  that  the  Secretary  -General  of  PIDF,  as  the  depositary  of  the Treaty,  is  responsible  for  registering  
the  Treaty  with  the  Secretariat  of  the  United Nations,  which  shall  in  turn  publish  the  Treaty  in  the  United  Nations     
Treaty Collection. The depositary is also tasked with transmitting certified copies of the Treaty and its Protocols to all members of 
PIDF as well as to States eligible to become Party to the  Treaty,  and  with  notifying  them  of  signatures  and  ratifications.  This  
provision mirrors  Article  16  of  the  South  Pacific  Nuclear  Free  Zone  Treaty,  which  endows  the Director of the South Pacific 
Forum with the responsibility for these tasks. 
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